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1. Introduction  
 
The interest of researchers in child labor has proliferated in recent years due to 
an increase in data availability, the size of the problem,
3 and the rise of child 
labour as one of the most politically sensitive issues in our globalised society 
and in the North South economic relationships. Even though there is a general 
consensus  on  its  negative  impact  on  the  current  and  future  wellbeing  of 
children, opinions regarding policy measures needed to tackle it, are mixed. 
On one side, “abolitionists” argue that the best solution is to ban child labour 
altogether. On the other side, “realists” affirm that its abolition may even be 
harmful  in  some  contexts  and  that  the  ultimate  solution  to  the  problem 
depends  on  the  removal  of  economic  conditions  leading  to  the  child  labour 
choice:  poor  parents  are  forced  to  make  their  children  work  and  would  be 
happy  to  switch  to  school  as  soon  as  their  economic  conditions  make  this 
choice feasible.  
Since child labour is concentrated in less developed countries the child labour 
controversy ends up having a trade related dimension. A portion of politicians 
and  civil  societies  in  developed  countries  desume  from  the  “abolitionist 
approach”  that  child made  products  have  to  be  banned.  This  measure 
however, is seen as a trade barrier by developing countries. On the corporate 
side,  the  “abolitionist”  approach  is  somewhat  consistent  with  the  strategy 
adopted  by  “no  child  labor”  labels  (such  as  Rugmark,  the  international 
                                                 
3 The International Labour Organization recently estimated the number of children engaged in 
work to be 218 million aged 14 and under (ILO 2006).   3 
nonprofit organization which provides child labor free certification), while the 
“realistic approach” is followed, among others, by the Fair Trade movement.
4  
The objective of our paper is to verify whether the “realistic” approach works 
by testing the effect of FT affliation on child schooling with field survey data. 
More specifically, both Rugmark and Fair Trade (FT) labels aim to sell ethical 
intangibles to concerned consumers, but their approach is quite the opposite. 
In the first case we have a “no child labor” constraint and no intervention on 
market prices
5 while, in the second case, producers are free to choose whether 
or not to send their children to school but receive a price premium from the 
organization. Therefore, while Rugmark may realize the goal of reducing child 
labor directly by banning it in its certified products,  FT aims to achieve the 
same goal indirectly by trying to create a virtuous circle between substitution 
and luxury axiom (Basu and Van, 1998). 
According to the first axiom, the diffusion of child labour may affect the local 
labour market by depressing adult wages. According to the second, parents 
send  children  to  school  if  they  overcome  a  given  income  threshold.  The 
combination of the two may create a vicious circle where household income 
below a subsistence threshold triggers child labour and the diffusion of child 
labour in the area depresses adult wages, thereby making child labour more 
necessary. Fair Trade, by increasing household income (due to the short term 
                                                 
4 IFAT, the main federation gathering producers and Fair Trade  organizations, specifies the 
criteria that affiliated producers have to follow. One of them claims that the participation of 
children,  if  any,  should  not  adversely  affect  their  well being,  security,  educational 
requirements and need for play, and should conform to the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child as well as the law and norms in the local context. 
 
5 In a recent theoretical model Baland and Duprez (2008) analysing the effects of competition 
between “child free” and standard products on market prices, outline conditions under which 
no child labour labels may enhance producers’ wellbeing. 
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price  premium  and  price  stability  effects  and  the  medium  term  productivity 
effect)
6  may  turn  the  vicious  circle  into  a  virtuous  one.  This  occurs  if  the 
reduction  of  child  labour  in  the  area,  due  to  the  originary  income  effect, 
generates a positive effect on adult wages. This last effect reinforces the initial 
shock thus pushing wages further from the luxury axiom threshold. 
A  second  line  of  interest  when  testing  the  impact  of  Fair  Trade  on  child 
education is the comparison of several empirical papers evaluating the effects 
of conditional cash programs aimed at discouraging child labour by lowering 
the  cost  of  schooling  via  educational  transfers  (Progresa  in  Mexico,  Bolsa 
Escola  in  Brazil,  Mid day  meals  program  in  India).
7  These  programs  have 
proven to be effective in reducing child labour (Schultz, 2004; Skoufias and 
Parker, 2001; Schady and Araujo, 2006). However, it is difficult to disentangle 
the effect of household income from the reduction of schooling cost effects in 
this literature.  
The  advantage  of  our  analysis  is  that  Fair  Trade  generates  a  pure  income 
effect  (albeit  from  different  sources)  without  any  change  in  the  cost  of 
schooling.  Another  significant  difference  with  respect  to  these  well  known 
programs  is  that  they  provide  subsidies  conditional  to  the  schooling  choice, 
thereby  assuming  that  it  is  worthwhile  to  encourage  schooling  (Baland  and 
                                                 
6 These effects should arise from the application of FT criteria. According to IFAT such criteria 
refer  to:  i)  Creation  of  opportunities  for  economically  disadvantaged  producers;  ii) 
Transparency and accountability; iii) Capacity building; iv)Promoting Fair Trade; v) Payment of 
a  fair  price;  vi)  Gender  Equity;  vii)  Working  conditions  (healthy  working  environment  for 
producers);  viii)  The  environment;  ix)  Trade  Relations  (Fair  Trade  Organizations  trade  with 
concern for the social, economic and environmental well being of marginalized small producers 
and do not maximise profit at their expense. They maintain long term relationships based on 
solidarity, trust and mutual respect that contribute to the promotion and growth of Fair Trade. 
Whenever  possible,  producers  are  assisted  with  access  to  pre harvest  or  pre production 
advance payment). For the literature debate on the controversial FT initiative see section 3. 
 
7 See Edmonds (2007).   5 
Duprez, 2007). Differently, Fair Trade affiliated households have an additional 
degree of freedom and may decide whether or not to send children to school. 
Our  empirical  analysis  falls  into  a  strand  of  literature  which  presents  mixed 
evidence  on  the  impact  of  income  on  child  labour.  Most  papers  find  the 
expected  negative  nexus  (Psacharopoulos,  1995;  Cartwright,  1999  and 
Edmonds,  2005)  while  others  do  not  register  a  significant  effect  (Deb  and 
Rosati, 2002). Ultimately in several theoretical models the income effect may 
be offset by a substitution effect, when a concurring increase in children wages 
takes place (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Psacharopoulos, 1997).  
The  goal  of  our  paper  is  to  verify  which  of  these  possible  relationships  is 
supported by our empirical findings. We do this using evidence collected from 
a field study in Chile on the Apicoop cooperative working with the FT channel. 
This paper includes six sections (including introduction and conclusions) and is 
structured  as  follows:  In  the  second  section  we  briefly  summarize  FT 
characteristics.  In  the  third  section  we  sum  up  features  of  the  FT affiliated 
Apicoop cooperative. In the fourth section we sketch a theoretical model which 
identifies income and substitution effects of Fair Trade affiliation and provides 
a  framework  for  the  empirical  analysis.  In  the  fifth  section  we  describe  our 
sample  features.  In  the  sixth  and  seventh  sections  we  illustrate  the 
econometric  methodology  and  describe  econometric  findings,  discussing  our 
evidence  in  the  light  of  standard  empirical  problems  of  reverse  causality, 
endogeneity  and  heterogeneity  of  the  treatment  and  control  samples.  The 
ninth section concludes. 
   6 
2. Fair trade  
Fair trade is an economic initiative promoted by importing organizations from 
Europe  and  the  US  and  aims  to  establish  long term  relationships  with 
associations of marginalized producers in LDCs in order to promote capacity 
building,  market  inclusion  and  improvement  of  local  wellbeing.  Fair  Trade 
criteria include: i) an anticyclical mark up on producers’ prices incorporating an 
insurance  mechanism  which  prevents  them  from  falling  below  a  certain 
threshold;
8  ii)  anticipated  financing  schemes;  iii)  export  services;  iv)  direct 
investment in local public goods (health, education) through the contribution 
provided to the local producers’ associations. 
More generally, it has been shown that FT criteria may help addressing market 
failures such as credit rationing, underinvestment in local public goods (health, 
education,  professional  training),  monopsony  of  local  intermediaries  and/or 
moneylenders (Becchetti and Rosati, 2007).
9 On the product market side, the 
success of these products has been shown to generate contagion effects on 
profit maximising competitors (Becchetti and Solferino, 2008).
10 
The economic debate on Fair Trade revolves around three main critiques. First, 
it has been observed that the intermediate good price mark up is a distortion 
                                                 
8  An  example  of  Fair  Trade  price  premium  is  in  the  banana  market.  In  Ecuador,  the  2005 
conventional market price for 1.14 kilos of bananas was 2.91 US $, against a FT price of 7.75 
US $. Evidence of FT premium on prices of coffee beans and cocoa in the last 20 years is also 
well known and available from the authors upon request. 
 
9 For a theoretical evaluation of the effects of FT from the perspective of trade theories see 
Maseland  and  De  Vaal  (2002).  Other  relevant  papers  dealing  with  various  aspects  of  the 
impact of FT are those of Moore (2004), Hayes (2004) and Redfern and Sneker (2002). 
 
10  Nestlè  introduced  in  October  2005  a  fair  trade  product  in  its  product  range,  Coop  UK 
launched its own fair trade product line, while Starbucks has rapidly become the main seller of 
FT coffee in the last few years. For a discussion on competition between fair trade dedicated 
retailers and supermarkets see also Kohler, 2007.  
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in respect to the market clearing price, generating excess supply and sending 
wrong  signals  to  producers.  Second,  it  has  been  noted  that  the  standard 
purchase plus charity donation scheme (for an amount equivalent to the price 
differential between the fair trade and the traditional product) may improve 
welfare with respect to the fair trade choice (LeClair, 2002). Third, it has been 
questioned that fair trade may produce negative effects on non affiliated local 
producers (LeClair, 2002). 
On the first point, it can be considered that the ancticyclical price premium 
may be perfectly consistent with market equilibrium in situations where local 
intermediaries  and  moneylenders  have  monopsony  power  on  marginalised 
producers.
11 Beyond this case, it has been considered that the mark up on the 
intermediate price, in itself an intangible, creates social and economic value
12 
and makes the final FT product differ from the standard one, converting fair 
trade to a sort of general purpose innovation which increases product variety.  
On the second critique, it must be taken into account that charity, dissimilar to 
the “portfolio vote” of FT consumers,
13 has no local antitrust effects and does 
                                                 
11 This has been verified for Meru Herbs by Becchetti and Costantino (2008) who find that fair 
trade reduced dependence of affiliated farmers from Nairobi intermediaries and by Becchetti et 
al. (2008) in a study on affiliated Peruvian wool producers in the Juliaca region (Titicaca lake) 
where the introduction of fair trade determined an increase in their bargaining power (and an 
improvement in price conditions) with local intermediaries. 
 
12 Becchetti  and  Michetti  (2008)  showed  how  Fair  Trade  affiliation  may  generate  significant 
impacts on a specific type of social capital by reinforcing both social cohesion and generalised 
trust. 
 
13 We should conceive FT as the most fashionable example of a more general phenomenon of 
consumers’  revealed  social  preferences  and  producers’  capacity  of  extracting  surplus  from 
them. Other recent interesting examples are the dedicated shops in Sicily selling products of 
entrepreneurs  who  decided  not  to  pay  fees  to  local  mafia  (“addiopizzo  shops”)  and  all  the 
initiatives  with  which  corporations  are  able  to  extract  the  “social  surplus”  from  socially 
responsible consumers. To quote just few of them, Cathay Pacific adopted a dual pricing policy 
offering to “concerned” consumers a more expensive air ticket where the price differential with 
respect to the standard one finances the CO2 reduction policies of the air company; Rabobank, 
Credit Agricole and other cooperative banks offer to address part of the matured interest on   8 
not  create  contagion  among  profit  maximising  competitors  of  fair  trade.  
Hence, if we accept that the previous considerations on the beneficial effects of 
FT  on  monopoly  rents  along  the  value  chain  are  correct,  FT  is  much  more 
powerful than charity in addressing them. 
The third critique requires empirical testing. Becchetti et al. (2007) addressed 
this problem in an impact analysis on the effects of affiliation on two different 
groups of Peruvian producers. They showed that the externalities on local non 
affiliated  producers  resulted  positive  in  one  case  and  negative  in  a  second 
case.  
Based  on  the  above  mentioned  debate  we  argue  that  Fair  trade  is  a  new 
emerging phenomenon which deserves adequate empirical investigation, for at 
least three additional reasons. 
First,  FT  practice  is  growing  more  rapidly  than  the  capacity  of  economists 
interpreting the phenomenon. Consumer class is growing very fast, and both 
socially and environmentally responsible consumption is becoming more and 
more fashionable in the US and in Europe. Concerned consumers pay attention 
not  only  to  prices  and  quality,  but  also  add  social  and  environmental 
considerations  to  purchased  goods.  In  this  sense,  the  consumer  choices 
embody opportunities to support sustainable development. 
On  September  the  3
rd  2008,  Ebay  launched  a  dedicated  platform 
(WorldOfGood.com)  for  fair  trade  e commerce.  It  calculates  that  the  U.S. 
market for such goods was $209 billion in 2005, and foreacasts that it will rise 
                                                                                                                                                                  
bank accounts to social as well as environmental missions (the additional cost may be paid 
only by clients or by clients and the bank). 
 
   9 
up to $420 billion in 2010. The little available data suggests that this fashion 
turned  into  significant  shares  in  some  market  segments  (47  percent  of 
bananas  in  Switzerland  and  20  percent  of  ground  coffee  in  the  UK),  with 
consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  social  and  environmental  responsibility    
revealed in different surveys around Europe – over and above these figures 
(Bird  and  Hughes,  1997;  Demos  and  PI/Coop,  2004;  De  Pelsmacker  et  al., 
2003).
14  
Second,  a  serious  problem  in  this  field  is  that  social  and  environmentally 
friendly characteristics of the products are not an experienced good. Hence, 
well grounded empirical work is needed to bridge informational asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers and to evaluate whether FT promises are met or 
not.  
Third,  FT  impact  analyses  may  verify  the  application  of  FT  criteria  and 
contribute to their redefinition.  
In  actual  fact,  the  FT  impact  study  literature  mainly  consists  of  some  well 
structured case studies (Bacon, 2005; Pariente, 2000; Castro, 2001; Nelson 
and Galvez, 2000; Ronchi, 2002; Yanchus and de Vanssay, 2003) and a few 
econometric impact analyses (Ruben, 2008). Ronchi (2006) finds on a panel 
based on 157 mill data that FT helped affiliated Costa Rican coffee producers 
to increase their market power. The author concludes that FT benefits are of a 
vertical integration type and that “the decision to support fair trade requires 
other information about its costs and benefits”. In an econometric study on the 
                                                 
14 It is commonly known that from the contingent claim literature, virtual willingness to pay 
generally tends to be higher than the revealed one (Diamond and Hausman, 1994). In our 
specific case we add that the virtual choice between a FT and a standard product is easier than 
the real life choice, due to the differences in search costs for the two types of products and 
asymmetric information of interviewed consumers about the ethical characteristics of the FT 
product.    10 
impact of FT on Kenyan farmers, Becchetti and Costantino (2008) show that 
capacity  bulding,  trade  and  product  risk  diversification  (an  element  not 
included in official criteria), which reduces their vulnerability to shocks, are the 
main sources of benefit for local affiliated producers. An empirical analysis on 
Peruvian producers (Becchetti et al., 2007) finds that affiliation has significant 
effects on professional self esteem and life satisfaction  (also not considered 
among FT criteria). 
The specific goal of our study is to analyse the effects of FT affiliation on child 
schooling by creating economic opportunities for poor producers. Moreover, as 
mentioned previously, FT may help in addressing market failures such as credit 
rationing by providing members with various advantages such as interest free 
credit  support,  anticipated  financial  schemes,  an  anticyclical  mark up  on 
producers’  prices  which  incorporates  an  insurance  mechanism,  and  product 
risk  diversification
15  which  lower  the  producers’  vulnerability  to  shocks 
(Becchetti  and  Costantino,  2008).  The  theoretical  and  empirical  literature 
supports the importance of access to the credit market and the containment of 
shocks  in  determining  the  household  decisions  concerning  children’s  time 
allocation.
16  The  imperfections  of  credit  and  insurance  markets,  both  formal 
and  informal  represent,  particularly  in  developing  countries,  a  very  relevant 
point in the allocation of household resources to human capital investments 
that are often suboptimal.  
                                                 
15  Good  markets  may  also  influence  child  labour  through  their  relative  return  to  child  time 
(Edmonds, 2007). 
 
16  Different  empirical  studies  show  the  relevance  of  access  to  credit  markets  and  of 
containment  of  shocks  in  determining  children’s  labor  supply.  See,  among  others,  Ranjan 
(2001), Cigno, Rosati, and Tzannatos (2002), Guarcello, Mealli and Rosati (2002).  
   11 
Our empirical analysis aims at verifying whether FT strategy is successful in 




Apicoop  is  a  Fair  Trade  organization  based  in  Paillaco,  a  village  close  to 
Valdivia in the region of Los Lagos in Chile, around 900 km south of the capital 
Santiago.  Its  history  traces  back  to  the  ‘70s  when  the  economic  situation 
during  the  dictatorship  was  very  difficult  and  the  Church  tried  to  promote 
development programs through the Diocese. As a consequence, in 1978 the 
Diocese  Valdivia  funded  Fundesval  (FUNdación  DESarrollo  VALdivia)  with 
capital coming from Western European donations. Fundesval was composed of 
six programs, one of which was related to the production of honey. The targets 
of the honey project were to create an additional source of income to farmers, 
create a cooperative where people could share knowledge and technology and 
improve the diet of the population through the consumption of honey.  
The  only  profitable  program  was  the  honey  production  project,  while  the 
remaining five programs were losing money and were finally closed in 1998, 
when the Diocese accepted the honey producers’ request to let them become 
independent and take over the cooperative in exchange of 180000 2008 USD. 
After the purchase of the cooperative, farmers invested a significant amount of 
money  to  realize  technical  improvements,  increase  total  production  and 
productivity  per  bee hive  and  achieve  financial  independence.  Over  the  last 
decade Apicoop has expanded its production considerably and has become the   12 
fourth Chilean exporter of honey and the first Chilean producer of Fair Trade 
honey. Nowadays the association is composed of 127 partners, 123 of whom 
are  individuals,  and  4  cooperatives,  concentrated  mostly  in  the  Los  Lagos 
region.  
Apicoop  members  benefit  from  the  commercialization  of  honey  through  the 
cooperative  and  receive  free  technical  assistance  and  interest free  credit 
support. Furthermore, FT associations provide contracts with longer prospects 
which in turn, reduce the variation of revenues and profits
17. All these valuable 
services  have  helped  farmers  to  increase  their  production  level  and  quality 
over time. 
 
4. The theoretical framework 
In order to sketch the potential effect of Fair Trade affiliation we start from the 
simplified  Edmonds  (2007)  model  in  which  the  arguments  of  the  household 
utility function U(S,Vk) are family wellbeing (S) and children’s future wellbeing 
(Vk). We assume as usual that U’(.)>0 and U’’(.)<0.  
Family  wellbeing  is  in  turn  specified  as  a  linear,  homogeneous  production 
function: S=F(c,H) 
Where (S) depends on purchased inputs (c) and hours that a child works inside 
the household (H).  
                                                 
17 In the period 2002 2004, for example, there has been a sudden rise in the honey price 
because of an antibiotic scandal which led the EU to ban the Chinese and Argentinean honey 
for two years. In 2005, once imports from China and Argentina were restarted, the price fell 
by more than 40%. Large fluctuations in honey prices like these can severely compromise the 
producer’s loan repayment schedule. 
   13 
Children’s wellbeing, Vk=R(E,P), is, in turn, a function of education (E), and 
leisure and play (P).
18 
The household faces the following budget constraint: 
c= Y+wM-eE  
Where (Y) is a parent’s exogenous income, (w) is a child’s exogenous wage, 
(M) is hours worked by the child, with (e) and (E) being the direct costs and 
the hours of child education respectively. 
As a consequence, parents maximise the following function: 
 
[ ] ) , ( ); , (
, , ,
P E R H eE wM Y F u Max
H P E M
- +           (1) 
Subject to: E+P+M+H=1; E≥0; P≥0; M≥0; H≥0 
 
Moreover, if child is engaged in wage work, parents decide not to send him to 
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That is, the marginal increase in the utility of parents (because of the higher 
children’s future wellbeing due to education) minus the marginal reduction in 
family wellbeing (due to the cost of education) is lower than or equal to the 
marginal utility of time. Although Fair Trade does not ban child labour, it may 
have some effects on its reduction due to the short run pure income effect 
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generated by the price premium applied on the commercialised honey. Since 
child  labour  is  not  banned,  both  adult  and  child  labor  incomes
19  may  rise. 
Assuming  that  Y  represents  the  total  amount  of  incomes  from  different 
sources, the condition (2) therefore turns into:   
 






















            (2’) 
Where c<c1= (Y+ Y) + (w+ w)M – eE 
 
The second term of the inequality has a first part which is now smaller, due to 
the concavity of the utility function. In other terms, at a higher family income 
level, the loss of family wellbeing due to the cost of education hits less. On the 
other hand, the second part of the second term is bigger since the opportunity 
cost of child education has increased because of the price premium. The effect 
of  Fair  Trade  on  child  labour  is  therefore  ambiguous  and  depends  on  the 
relative size of the first and the second part. Consider,  however, that most 
empirical studies, including that of Becchetti and Castriota (2008) on the same 
Chilean  sample  of  honey  producers,  emphasize  that,  in  the  medium  run, 
affiliation years progressively increase productivity and in turn the income of 
affiliated producers vis-à-vis the control sample of producers working in the 
same  area.
20  To  take  into  account  the  medium  run  effect  of  Fair  Trade  we 
should rewrite (2’) as  
                                                 
19 If the child also works for FT certified products. 
 
20 The authors find that affiliation years have positive effect on honey sold per hour worked, 
net of the economies of scale effect to which also FT contributes. The main candidate for this   15 
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Where  p j r t t eE M w w Y Y c c c c a - D + + D + = < < ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1  
 
with  a t   and  c t   being  respectively  the  medium  run  productivity  multiplier  on 
adult income and child wages,  r  the probability that the child will still work 
over the medium term and  j  the probability that he will continue to do the 
same job.  
There  are  three  differences  between  short  and  medium  run  effects.  In  the 
medium term, higher productivity increases both adult income and child labour 
income, more so than in the short run, and it has effects on children's future 
wellbeing from education (assuming that the child will do the same job with 
probabilityj ). We have therefore, two positive effects against a negative one 
in terms of reduction in child labour. 
If the latter is smaller, the medium run effect of FT in terms of child labour 
reduction should be positive and larger than in the short run effect and any 
affiliation year would generate an additional positive effect on schooling. 
 
5. Descriptive findings  
Evidence  presented  in  the  following  sections  derives  from  234  honey 
producers,  randomly  sampled  from  two  previously  created  treatment  and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
effect is the higher possibility of affiliated producers to benefit from training courses, advances 
of payments and cooperation with other local producers.   16 
control group sets  containing  farmers affiliated and not affiliated to  Apicoop 
respectively.  
FT has existed in the area for many years, making it impossible to create a 
randomised  experiment  to  analyse  its  impact.  However  in  the  following 
section, we show a methodology and a series of robustness checks which make 
us  quite  confident  that  the  selection  bias  problem  does  not  invalidate  our 
findings.  What  we  already  anticipate  is  that  the  availability  of  a  graduated 
exposition to the treatment (different years of affiliation) allows us to perform 
robustness  check  estimates  only  on  the  treatment  group,  thereby  reducing 
many  of  the  problems  related  to  the  heterogeneity  between  treatment  and 
control group individuals. 
Producers  were  interviewed  in  February  and  March  2008.  The  questionnaire 
consisted of a set of standard questions on socio demographic and economic 
variables, plus other questions related specifically to honey production. Table 1 
describes the variables considered in this study while Table 2 illustrates their 
summary statistics for the whole sample of affiliated (Flo) and non affiliated 
(no Flo) producers. 
The majority of interviewed producers are male, middle aged, with elementary 
or  intermediate  education  (although  there  are  some  people  with  no  formal 
education). On average, around 42 percent of the total farmers’ income comes 
from honey, an additional 7 percent from other activities connected to bees 
while the remaining 51 percent comes from agriculture, breeding  and other 
activities. Honey and other products  from bees play a crucial role for these 
families. The average production of honey is 3,000 kg, but the second quartile   17 
is only 1,000 kg. Therefore, the majority of the sample is composed of small 
producers. The average productivity of honey per hour of work devoted to this 
activity  is  180  kg,  with  notable  dispersion  due  to  experience,  capital 
accumulated, and the technology adopted. 
Becchetti and Castriota (2008), using treatment regression and Peer Matching 
models,  find  that  the  higher  productivity  of  Apicoop’s  producers  is  partially 
explained by their superior capacity to exploit economies of scale. The lack of 
time series data prevents them from fully disentangling the productivity effect 
due  to  selection  bias,  from  that  attributable  to  FT  affiliation.  However, 
Apicoop’s producers receive more training courses and advances of payments 
than  independent  ones.  It  suggests  that  affiliation  contributed  both  to,  and 
independently from, the economies of scale effect.  
In our study it is necessary to avoid omitted variable biases by considering all 
relevant factors affecting child schooling. Again from Table 2 we can see that 
the number of producers’ school years is twice that of their parents: there is a 
clear  advancement  in  the  average  level  of  education  due  to  the  improving 
economic  conditions  of  the  country  as  a  whole,  which  is  a  worldwide  trend 
common in both rich and poor countries.  
A second important observation regarding education is the existence of a large 
number of producers with recent affiliation. More than a third, 36.15 percent, 
have less than 4 years of affiliation while 50 percent have less than 6 years 
(see  Table  3).  Figure  1  shows  the  education  level  of  the  producer  and  his 
parents  by  the  number  of  affiliation  years,  averaged  over  the  period  2001 
2007. The higher the FT age is, the lower the average level of education.    18 
Table 4 shows the average education levels by year and by subgroup of FT age 
for the producer and his parents. Looking at each column we can see that the 
education  level  of  new  FT  members  is  higher  than  that  of  older  members, 
while, looking at table rows, we can see the increase of the level of education 
over  time.  The  same  relationship  is  confirmed  if  we  replace  the  producer’s 
education with the schooling years of his parents.
21  
Specifications of econometric estimates which follow will take into account the 
descriptive results: i) by considering the increasing trend of scholarisation we 
introduce year dummies in our econometric estimates. Given the prevalence of 
producers with a limited number of affiliation years, omission of year effects 
would probably determine a downward bias on the effect of affiliation years on 
child  schooling;  ii)  by  considering  the  strong  negative  correlation  between 
years of affiliation and the producers’ education we introduce fixed effects. The 
omission  of  fixed  effects  (which  can  capture,  among  other  time  invariant 
components,  the  education  level  of  the  producer  and  of  his  parents)  could 
again,  downward  bias  the  effect  of  affiliation  on  child  schooling,  given  the 
expected  positive  relationship  between  education  and  the  decision  to  send 
children to school.  
 
6. Econometric approach 
An important problem in development studies is how to reconcile the need of 
inferring causal relationships with the difficulty of performing repeated surveys 
(especially  in  situations  where  attrition  problems  may  be  difficult  to 
                                                 
21 The only exception is the education of the producer’s mother for affiliation year cohort 10 12 
which can be attributed to some noise given the reduced number of observations considered in 
the considered subsample.   19 
overcome). In this paper we propose a “backcast panel” approach which allows 
us  to  reconstruct  panel  data  from  a  unique  cross sectional  survey.  More 
specifically, we ask each producer the number of his/her offspring and the age 
and number of schooling years for each of them. To complete our information, 
we also ask producers the age at which each child started school and whether 
there were cases of exits and re entries.  
As  commonly  recognised,  we  should  rely  on  answers  regarding  recent  past 
events, so that they are not too difficult to recall. Consider also, that standard 
cross sectional  surveys  data  require  a  certain  degree  of  memory  from  the 
respondents  (after  all,  all  questions  refer  to  past  events,  even  though  they 
occurred in the same or previous year). In this respect we reasonably argue 
that  it  is  not  difficult  for  a  parent  to  remember  an  important  part  of  their 
children’s  past  such  as  the  number  of  their  schooling  years.
22  With  this 
information we can reconstruct, year by year (from 1987 to 2007), schooling 
decisions  taken  by  the  household.  After  that  we  are  able  to  regress  the 
schooling decisions on fixed effects which incorporate the impact of a set of 
controls  that  are  time  invariant  during  the  panel  period, 
23  and  on  factors 
where variation can be reconstructed without information collected in the years 
before the survey 
24. Note that in this way we rely on a small set of easily 
defined  variables  where  measurement  error  problems  should  be  relatively 
limited. 
                                                 
22 On the methodology for the construction of retrospective panel data with memorable events 
see also McIntosh, Villaran, and Wydick (2007). 
 
23 Including gender, schooling years of the producer and of the producer’s parents 
 
24  Those are Age, participation to the treatment or to the control sample, FT affiliation years, 
number of children in the school age cohort. 
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Once we have constructed the database we can calculate a time varying index 
of human capital investment for each producer, represented by the number of 
children attending  school over the total number of children in the schooling 
age  cohort  in  the  given  year.  More  formally,  the  household  schooling 
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where the HSIit index is composed of the number of the j children of the i th 
producer in a chosen school age cohort (e.g. age range between 6
25 and 18, if 
we are interested in elementary, middle and high school, and between 13 and 
18 if we are only interested in high school, etc.) who actually went to school in 
a  given  year  t  (TOTSCHijt),  divided  by  the  number  of  children  of  the  i th 
producer being in the school age cohort in the same period (TOTPOTijt).
26 In 
other words, the HSIit index is a ratio of effective to potential household school 
attendance.  In  our  first  exercise  the  dependent  variable  is  regressed  on 
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25 Entry age is generally 5 or 6 and is based on the respondent declaration. 
 
26 The total number of children for each farmer (ni) is indexed to account for heterogeneity in 
household size.   21 
where  (Ageit)  is  the  age  of  the  i th  producer  at  time  t,  (TOTPOTit)  is  the 
denominator of the schooling index or the number of children for the selected 
school age cohort in a given year, (FTageit) are years of FT affiliation, (Dtimet) 
are  year  dummies  and  ui  is  the  producer  specific  intercept  typical  of  fixed 
effect  models.  The  effect  of  other  variables  such  as  gender  and  respondent 
schooling  years  are  captured  by  fixed  effects  which  also  capture  other  non 
measurable individual time invariant characteristics. 
A traditional problem which may not be fully overcome in our estimates is the 
omission of current income. If it is true that this omission may generate an 
upward bias on the affiliation coefficient, it is also true that, as far as affiliation 
has positive effects on income, as shown in previous estimates, (see Becchetti 
and Castriota, 2008) part of the positive effect of income on schooling should 
be  attributed  to  Fair  Trade.  Consider also  that  factors  incorporated  into  the 
fixed effects, such as schooling years and age cohort, are generally accepted 
as  proxies  of  this  unobserved  variable.  Starting  from  this  fixed  effect 
specification, we will move to different approaches in order to face the main 
issues  arising  from  our  empirical  analysis:  heterogeneity  between  the 
treatment  and  control  groups,  reverse  causation,  endogeneity,  omitted 
variable bias.  
 
7. Empirical findings: dealing with heterogeneity between treatment 
and control samples 
In  table  5.1  we  present  results  from  fixed  effect  estimates  in  which  the 
dependent variable differs according to the considered school age cohort (from   22 
10 18 and from 14 18, age ranges). We find that the affiliation year variable is 
always significant and positive. The magnitude of the coefficients tells us that 
one additional year of affiliation raises the schooling index within the 14 18 
age  range  by  around  1.8  percent.  The  FT  effects  are  stronger  in  the  high 
school age cohort and are gradually reduced downward (in regards to the 10 
18 interval one year of FT affiliation has a positive impact of .9 percent on the 
schooling index). The total number of children in the considered school age 
interval for a given year (TOTPOT) is negative and becomes significant in the 
last  three  equations  (from  12 18  and  from10 18,  age  ranges).    The  sign  is 
reasonable since, the higher the number of children sent to school, the larger 
the total cost of education for the household. 
An interesting point to have emerged is related to the producer’s age which is 
always negative and strongly significant, with a coefficient magnitude between 
.2  and  .3.  This  implies  that,  net  of  the  year  effects  capturing  country  level 
changes, and net of the parents’ education years absorbed in the fixed effects, 
the older the father the lower the child schooling index. This variable could 
capture the progressively reduced working ability of the father which increases 
the opportunity cost of sending children to school.  
Finally,  coefficients  of  the  different  year  dummies  clearly  evidence  a 
progressive trend toward increased human capital investment at country level 
(to which the dynamics of domestic GDP growth must have contributed). This 
is  consistent  with  evidence  shown  in  Figure  1  on  respondents  and  the 
schooling years of their parents. The lack of consideration of this phenomenon 
would have downward biased the effect of FT affiliation, since there is a large   23 
share of recently affiliatiated producers (Table 2) and, who are therefore, more 
likely to send their children to school. 
On the other hand, the introduction of fixed effects marks another downward 
bias of the impact of affiliation on schooling. As shown in the previous section, 
and  also  due  to  the  progressive  tightening  of  cooperative  entry  standards, 
more recently affiliated producers tend to have higher education and, for this 
reason, they are expected to be more likely to send their children to school.  
We  are  aware  that  an  important  missing  variable  in  our  estimate  is  the 
dynamics  of  household  income  across  estimation  years.  This  is  a  typical 
problem  in  child  schooling  estimates.  Literature  usually  accepts  that  this 
missing variable is proxied by household education and by the producer’s age. 
The  inclusion  in  our  specification  of  the  total  number  of  children  in  the 
schooling  age  cohort  in  the  year  of  interest,  should  also  help  because  it 
captures an effect which reduces household income available for the education 
of any individual child. 
One  potential  limit  of  our  approach  lies  in  the  heterogeneity  between  the 
treatment and control sample. It has, in fact, been observed that problems in 
the definition of the control sample may introduce systematic biases between 
control  and  treatment  observations  which  may  affect  the  validity  of  the 
empirical findings. A Heterogeneity problem may apply to our analysis where 
we have a situation of non random placement in the program (the decision to 
affiliate to FT is not random but depends on a decision taken in the past by the 
observed producers).    24 
As an extreme solution to this problem we re estimate our model by excluding 
observations from the control sample. This is possible since, contrary to many 
cases in which the treatment effect can just be measured by a (0/1) dummy, 
we have a measure of the graduation or intensity of the treatment (number of 
affiliation years). 
A  primary  variation  with  respect  to  what  is  shown  in  Table  5.1,  is  that  the 
magnitude  of  the  affiliation  year  coefficient  is  larger,  by  around  4  percent 
(Table 5.2). However, the first two coefficients are significant at 90 percent 
and the standard deviation of the coefficient is much higher. The overlap of 
confidence  intervals  leads  us  to  conclude  that  the  difference  in  magnitude 
between  coefficients  in  Table  5.1  and  5.2  is  not  significant.  A  secondary 
variation  is  that  the  variable  measuring  the  total  number  of  children  in  the 
given  school  age  cohort  is  no  longer  significant.  This  implies  that,  within 
cooperative members, the negative effect of a higher number of children in 
education hits less than in the overall sample.  
At  this  point  of  the  analysis  we  wonder  why  affiliation  years  increase  child 
schooling.  We  have  two  main  interpretations  for  this  effect.  First,  affiliation 
raises  household  income  by  increasing  productivity  in  more  affiliated 
producers,  vis-à-vis  the  control  sample.  This  was  also  found  on  the  same 
sample  by  Becchetti  et  al.  (2008),  where  the  affiliation  seems  to  help 
producers exploit economies of scale and get closer to the optimal productive 
dimension. They also find that the positive affiliation effect on productivity may 
be explained by three factors offered by the cooperative (training, cooperation 
and advances on payments) (see footnote 8).   25 
However,  an  alternative  interpretation  is  that  cooperative  rules  and  its 
attention  toward  child  schooling  play  an  important  role  in  determining  this 
result.
27  Unfortunately,  it  is  not  possible  to  discriminate  between  these  two 
interpretations with the available information. 
 
8. Reverse causality and endogeneity: a GMM approach 
Do our results suggest that FT affiliation positively affects child schooling or 
should we interpret them in the reverse way? It is, in fact possible that explicit 
selection  criteria  admit  producers  into  the  cooperative,  only  with  higher 
education and who are more willing to send their children to school. It is also 
possible that affiliation is driven by an unobservable such as entrepreneurial 
ability (implicit selection) which is, in turn, correlated with income and child 
schooling decisions. 
An initial argument against reverse causality is the observation of the positive 
effect of any additional affiliation year on child schooling. The reverse causality 
link is mostly a once for all effect. If it were the only one to work, there would 
be  less  reason  to  expect  that  the  positive  relationship  between  FT  and 
schooling years progresses with affiliation seniority. This specific finding (even 
though it cannot exclude the joint presence of a reverse causation once for all 
effect  too)  further  suggests  that  there  is  something  which  can  be  acquired 
through  the  affiliation  experience  which  promotes  child  schooling. 
Furthermore,  our  previous  result  on  the  absence  of  a  significant  difference 
                                                 
27 Even though, as we remember, FT does not impose a ban on child labor, it has the explicit 
goal of improving gradually children wellbeing and therefore promotes their education when 
the household has sufficient income to afford it.   26 
between  affiliated  pre affiliation  trends  and  control  sample  trends  in  child 
schooling rules out other possible forms of endogeneity. 
A second argument comes from the observation of the Apicoop history. Entry 
requirements  have  become  progressively  stricter  so  that,  if  a  selection  bias 
exists,  it  should  act  in  the  opposite  way  and  offset  the  potential  impact  of 
affiliation years on productivity. In 2006 this was made explicit in the statute 
of Apicoop, which now establishes a set of requisites in order to be accepted. 
The most important of them states that the applicant must have at least 3 
years of proven honey production and at least 25 beehives.  The progressively 
more  severe  affiliation  criteria  are  consistent  with  what  we  found  in  our 
descriptive  findings.  We  clearly  illustrated  how  a  “vintage”  factor  such  as  a 
producer’s scholarisation (invariant from the first affiliation year to now) which 
should be correlated with productive skills, gets larger over time (see Figure 
1).  
We do, however, want to tackle the casuality and endogeneity problem with a 
quantitative  approach,  re estimating  the  model  in  a  dynamic  panel 
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where  t i l k HSI , ) , ( t t  is the schooling investment index for the  ) , ( l k t t  school age 
cohort, Totpot ) , ( l k t t  is the total number of a producer’s children in the school 
age  cohort  when  considering  the  age  interval  and  the  other  variables  as 
defined in (4).    27 
The  specification  presented  in  (4)  contains  lagged  values  of  the  dependent 
variable among regressors. Arellano and Bover (1995) together with Blundell 
and  Bond  (1998)  demonstrate  that  the  correlation  between  the  lagged 
dependent  variable  and  the  error  term  makes  OLS  estimates  biased  and 
inconsistent, even when error terms are not serially correlated. 
They develop a GMM approach to tackle this issue and as in the GMM way, we 
identify a set of endogenous or predetermined, and a set of strictly exogenous, 
instruments. In the first case we chose the education of the producer and of 
the  producer’s  parents.  In  the  second  one  we  chose  two  and  three  period 
lagged values of affiliation years plus year dummies. 
In order to estimate Euler equations in our paper we follow the system GMM 
approach  with  two step  estimates  of  regressors’  coefficients.  We  use  robust 
two step estimates with the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction which 
has been shown to reduce the bias of excessively low standard errors in two 
step estimates. 
Diagnostics  on  these  estimates  show  that  residuals  are  first  order,  but  not 
second order, autocorrelated, consistently with one of the base assumptions 
required for a GMM estimate (Table 6.2). The Sargan test does not reject the 
null  hypothesis  of  the  overall  validity  of  the  instruments  we  use  in  our 
estimates. The null of exogeneity of our strictly exogenous instruments (two 
and three period lagged values of affiliation years plus time dummies) is not 
rejected by the Davidson McKinnon test. 
Signs are those expected and confirm results from fixed effect specification: 
producer’s  age  is  negative  and  significant,  producer’s  education,  which  was   28 
previously  absorbed  in  the  fixed  effects,  is  now  negative  and  significant  as 
expected. The Totpot variable is not significant. A likely interpretation is that 
its effect is entirely absorbed by the lagged dependent variable. The magnitude 
of the positive and significant affiliation year effect is now around 1.5 percent, 
very close to the values found in fixed effect estimates. 
As a further check on our findings we consider that our results might also be 
explained  by  a  significant  difference  in  pre affiliation  trends  (hence 
heterogeneity  between  the  treatment  and  control  sample  and  where  FT 
benefits would not be the driver of the affiliation effect). We therefore add to 
Table 6.2, a test on the assumption of common pre existing trends between 
treatment and control producers. More specifically, we re estimate the model 
in the subsample of observations of control and treatment producers before FT 
affiliation.  Furthermore, with respect to the standard specification we replace 
the Ftage variable with a trend variable multiplied by a dummy which picks up 
future  affiliated  producers.  The  interaction  variable  is  never  significant  in 
supporting the hypothesis of common preaffiliation trends between treatment 
and control producers. 
An even more drastic solution to the problem of heterogeneity between the 
treatment  and  control  sample  is,  as  in  the  case  of  fixed  effects,  the  re 
estimation of the model with observations from the treatment sample only to 
eliminate  the  problem  of  heterogeneity  between  the  treatment  and  control 
samples.  We  find  that  the  effects  of  affiliation  years  remain  robust  and  the 
diagnostics of the GMM estimates are substantially unchanged (Table 6.3).   29 
We apply the same reasoning to preaffiliation trends on the estimate restricted 
to  the  treatment  sample.  Alternatively,  an  observationally  equivalent 
explanation  of  our  findings  here  could  be  heterogeneity  between  older  and 
younger affiliated producers, with the former having steeper trend effects on 
the dependent variable with respect to the latter. In this case the positive Ft 
age  coefficient  would  not  depend  on  FT  affiliation  benefits  but  would  just 
reflect heterogeneity among different affiliation cohorts. Again, we restrict the 
treatment  sample  estimate  to  the  preaffiliation  period  and  create  two 
additional variables: a linear trend multiplied for a (0/1) dummy for producers 
with less than 5 years of affiliation and the same linear trend multiplied for a 
(0/1) dummy for producers with more than 10 years of affiliation. Coefficients 
and  standard  errors  of  the  two  variables,  shown  in  Table  6.3,  reject  the 
assumption of significant preaffiliation trends. 
 
9. Conclusions 
Our paper aims to test the effect of a relatively rarely explored approach to 
improve the wellbeing of marginalized producers (Fair Trade) with original field 
data and an innovative methodological approach. 
The originality of the FT strategy is that it does not directly impose restrictions 
on  child  labour  but  tries  to  reduce  it  indirectly,  by  promoting  short  (price 
premia) and long (capacity building) run increases in a producer’s household 
income. 
We try to overcome the difficulty of building panel data with surveys repeated 
over  time  in  field  development  studies  by  using  backcast  panel  data   30 
methodology.  This  reconstructs  retrospectively  “memorable”  past  values  of 
relevant  variables  based  on  cross sectional  information  collected  in  a  single 
survey. 
This  approach  asks  respondents  to  reconstruct  some  essential  traits  of  the 
schooling records of their children (year of entry and year of exit). Its success 
and  minimization  of  measurement  error  depends  on  the  fact  that  very  few 
memorable  events  in  the  past  are  referred  to  (it  is  hard  to  imagine  that  a 
parent does not remember the scholarisation level of his/her children). 
Our empirical analysis is framed in a very simple theoretical approach. From 
first order conditions of a standard problem of maximization of a household 
who cares about its own and its children’s present and future wellbeing, we 
observe that FT affiliation may generate income and substitution effects. The 
direction  of  the  total  effect  is  therefore  unclear  and  needs  to  be  tested 
empirically. 
In the econometric part of the paper we start by carefully reflecting on the 
consequences of omitted variable biases. In this respect, with fixed and year 
effects we demonstrate how to avoid two potentially omitted variable problems 
in  our  survey  (negative  correlation  between  affiliation  year  and  producer’s 
education and a relatively larger number of producers with a small amount of 
affiliation years).  
We  also  carefully  examine  whether  the  observed  positive  and  significant 
relationship between affiliation years and child schooling may be affected by 
problems of heterogeneity between the treatment and control sample, reverse 
causality and endogeneity.   31 
Robustness  checks  of  estimates  restricted  to  the  treatment  group,  dynamic 
GMM  regressions  with  proper  predetermined  and  strictly  exogenous 
instruments,  tests  on  common  preaffiliation  trends  (between  treatment  and 
control producers and between young and old affiliated) and the history of the 
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Table 1: Description of variables used 
   
Variable  Description 
 
Male  DV equal to 1 if the respondent is male 
Age  Age in years 
Education  Years of school attended 
Education mother  Education of the mother in years 
Education father  Education of the father in years 
Children  Number of children 
Income total  Actual total income realized last year 
Income honey  Income from honey last year 
Income bees  Income from other bees' products last year 
Honey production  Total production of honey in kilos 
Productivity per hour  Prodution of honey per hour worked 
Flo 
DV (dummy variable) equal to 1 if the respondent is 
directly associated to FT cooperatives 
Half Flo 
DV equal to 1 if the respondent is only indirectly 
associated to FT cooperatives 
No Flo 
DV equal to 1 if the respondentis not associated to FT 
cooperatives 
FT age  Number of affiliation years 
   
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
                 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Q* 1  Q* 2  Q* 3  Max 
                 
Male  234  0.84  0.37  0  1  1  1  1 
Age  234  49.74  12.70  24  40  50  59  88 
Education  233  9.92  4.19  0  7  10  12  22 
Education mother  224  4.56  4.01  0  1  4  6  16 
Education father  224  4.66  4.27  0  1  4  6  18 
Children  231  2.50  1.89  0  1  2  4  11 
Income total  231  4,988,680  11,400,000  0  1,015,000  2,500,000  5,000,000  110,000,000 
Income honey  229  2,109,031  3,878,463  0  300,000  1,000,000  2,350,000  40,000,000 
Income bees  230  346,100  1,016,250  0  0  0  50,000  10,000,000 
Honey production  225  3,232  6,134  0  300  1,000  3,000  60,000 
Productivity per hour  224  180  306  0  36  78  200  3,333 
Flo  234  0.46  0.50  0  0  0  1  1 
Half Flo  234  0.12  0.33  0  0  0  0  1 
No Flo  234  0.42  0.49  0  0  0  1  1 
FT age  137  6.90  5.36  0  3  3  10  25 
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Table 3: Distribution of affiliated producers by FT age 
           
Affiliation years  Observations  Percent  Cumulative 
1  14  10.77  10.77 
2  13  10.00  20.77 
3  20  15.38  36.15 
4  10  7.69  43.85 
5  9  6.92  50.77 
6  7  5.38  56.15 
7  2  1.54  57.69 
8  8  6.15  63.85 
9  2  1.54  65.38 
10  19  14.62  80.00 
11  2  1.54  81.54 
12  7  5.38  86.92 
14  3  2.31  89.23 
15  4  3.08  92.31 
16  1  0.77  93.08 
18  2  1.54  94.62 
20  6  4.62  99.23 
25  1  0.77  100.00 
Total  130  100  100 
 
Table 4: Education level by number of affiliation years 
                       
Aff.Years  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001 
               
Education of the producer           
               
1 3  10.40  10.45  10.43  10.44  10.37  10.38  10.15 
4 6  10.38  9.52  9.58  8.37  8.60  8.11  8.62 
7 9  8.37  8.60  8.11  8.42  6.77  6.00  6.50 
10 12  8.62  6.77  6.00  6.50  6.80  7.66  6.50 
                       
Aff.Years  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001 
               
Education of the producer's father         
               
1 3  5.33  5.18  5.21  5.18  5.11  5.10  4.89 
4 6  3.94  4.41  3.58  3.77  3.23  2.89  2.88 
7 9  3.17  3.26  2.89  2.88  1.80  2.14  2.37 
10 12  2.89  1.80  2.14  2.37  3.20  3.00  2.50 
                       
Aff.Years  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001 
               
Education of the producer's mother         
               
1 3  5.16  5.09  5.04  5.04  4.96  4.98  4.80 
4 6  4.00  3.70  4.16  3.39  3.50  2.62  2.88 
7 9  3.39  3.05  2.62  1.88  1.50  2.71  1.87 
10 12  1.88  1.50  2.71  2.87  3.40  4.00  4.00 
                         37 
 
































Note: Figures refer to averages over the period 2001 2007 
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Table 5.1 Fixed effects model over the full sample 
                    
     HIS 10-18  HIS 11-18  HIS 12-18  HIS 13-18  HIS 14-18 
             
Tot. Pot.     0.030962   0.0311771   0.0299827   0.0212994   0.0185246 
    ( 3.33)  ( 2.87)  ( 2.31)  ( 1.32)  ( 0.93) 
Age     0.0273542   0.0248527   0.0213023   0.0199538   0.017313 
    ( 10.45)  ( 8.50)  ( 6.43)  ( 5.39)  ( 4.16) 
FT Age    0.0095477  0.0126911  0.0148914  0.0158515  0.0181 
    (2.29)  (2.70)  (2.81)  (2.57)  (2.56) 
                    
             
N    1.823  1.691  1.544  1.388  1.222 
Nr. of Groups    165  165  160  151  148 
R
2 within    0.1303  0.1130  0.0996  0.0943  0.0931 
R
2 between    0.0444  0.0416  0.0416  0.0266  0.0180 
R
2 overall     0.0545  0.0506  0.0423  0.0322  0.0286 
F1(overall  











F2 (significance  











                    
             
  
Table 5.2 Fixed effects model (treatment group only) 
                    
      HIS 10-18  HIS 11-18  HIS 12-18  HIS 13-18  HIS 14-18 
             
Tot. Pot.     0.0293442   0.0542311   0.0423416   0.069751   0.118689 
    ( 1.08)  ( 1.84)  ( 1.18)  ( 1.55)  ( 2.28) 
Age      0.051717   0.054143   0.054811   0.0510052   0.0465714 
    ( 2.67)  ( 2.62)  ( 2.38)  ( 2.05)  ( 1.72) 
FT Age    0.0475852  0.0513154  0.0539982  0.0527196  0.0487114 
    (2.30)  (2.29)  (2.14)  (1.92)  (1.60) 
                    
N    450  426  397  366  330 
Nr. of Groups    75  75  71  68  67 
R
2 within    0.1715  0.1650  0.1511  0.1773  0.1879 
R
2 between    0.0082  0.0013  0.0034  0.0017  0.0000 
R
2 overall     0.0276  0.0226  0.0143  0.0203  0.0229 
F1(overall  























                    
We estimate the following model 
t i i
k
k k it it it it u Dtime FTage TOTPOT Age HSI , 3 2 1 0 e b a a a a + + + + + + = ∑  
where (Ageit) is the age of the i th producer at time t, (TOTPOTit) is the denominator of the 
schooling index or the number of children for the selected school age cohort in a given year, 
(FTageit) are years of FT affiliation, (Dtimet) are year dummies and ui is the producer specific 
intercept typical of fixed effect models. Table 6.2 Robustness check: GMM estimates on the effects of FT affiliation on the Household Schooling Index (treatment and control 
group)  
 
10-18 SCHOOL AGE 
COHORT  11-18 SCHOOL AGE COHORT  12-18 SCHOOL AGE COHORT  13-18 SCHOOL AGE COHORT  14-18 SCHOOL AGE COHORT 
HSIi,t-1  .349     .227     .0636  -.0476     .2813 
  (2.05)     (1.39)     (0.28)     (-0.24)     (1.18) 
, 1 i t Ftage -    .009      .012     .0164      .0180    .0124    
  (4.05)     (4.41)     (5.89)     (5.40)     (3.02) 
TOTPOT  .047  .0361  .0847  1.302  -.0766 
  (0.92)  (0.70)  (1.50)  (1.78)  (-1.81) 
Schoolyear  .0451  .0768  .119  0.116  .1447 
  (2.12)  (3.56)  (4.56)  (3.91)  (4.41) 
Age     .0092        -.027       -.0371     -.049     -.0345    
  (4.05)     (4.42)     (5.86)  (-5.86)     (-3.16) 
Number of obs.  1521  1398  1259  1116  1100 


































































The base specification is:  t i
k
k k t i t i l k t i t i l k t i l k Dtime Ftage Totpot Age HSI HSI , 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( e b a t t a a t t a a t t + + + + + + = ∑ - - - -  
where  t i l k HSI , ) , ( t t  is the schooling investment index for the  ) , ( l k t t  school age cohort ( see Table 1 legend), Totpot ) , ( l k t t  is the total number of producer’s children in 
the school age cohort, Ftage is the number of affiliation years, Age is producer’s years and Totpot the number of children in the school age given the selected school age 
cohort, Dtime are year dummies. The equation is estimated with a system GMM model with two step coefficients and Windmejier (2005) correction to obtain unbiased 
standard errors. Variables used for building endogenous or predetermined (GMM) instruments are producer’s and producer’s mother and father schoolyears. Variables used 
for building strictly exogenous instruments are two and three period lagged affiliation years. Time dummy coefficients are omitted and available upon request. The Sargan 
statistic is distributed as a χ
2 under the null of instrument validity. AR(1) and AR(2) are  tests for first and second order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as a N(0,1) under the null of instrument validity. The Davidson McKinnon statistic is distributed as an F under the null of orthogonality of the set of strictly 
exogenous instruments to the error term of the base estimate. * We estimate the model in the subsample of the control group and the treatment group before affiliation. 
We introduce a variable in which a linear trend is multiplied for the treatment group dummy and test whether the latter it is significantly different from zero. The table 
report the coefficient and the t statistics.   40
Table 6.3 Robustness check: GMM estimates on the effects of FT affiliation on the Household Schooling Index (treatment group only)  
  10-18 SCHOOL AGE COHORT  11-18 SCHOOL AGE COHORT  12-18 SCHOOL AGE COHORT  13-18 SCHOOL AGE COHORT  14-18 SCHOOL AGE COHORT 
             
HSIi,t-1  .330     .078     .295  .273     .367 
  (1.89)     (0.49)     (1.50)     (1.32)     (1.85) 
, 1 i t Ftage -    .005      .007     .080      .004    .002    
  (1.79)     (2.41)     (2.12)     (1.05)     (1.46) 
TOTPOT  .088  .093  1.143  .068  .048 
  (1.46)  (1.65)  (1.64)  (0.89)  (0.52) 
Schoolyear  .110  .0768  .170  0.201 
.154 
(3.26) 
  (3.14)  (3.56)  (4.15)  (4.54)   
Age     .0076      .023       .0111     -.049     .020    
  (0.62)     (2.20)     (0.82)  (-5.86)     (1.45) 
Number of obs.  408  379  353  316  274 






























Test on common pre-
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We  estimate  the  model  in  the  subsample  of  the  control  group  and  the  treatment  group  before  affiliation.  We  introduce  a 
variable  in  which  a  linear  trend  is  multiplied  for the  treatment  group  dummy  and  test  whether  the  latter  it  is  significantly 
different from zero. The table reports the coefficient and the t statistics. For the legend see Table 6.2. 